This paper considers the empirical assessment of the relationship between prices and number of firms in local markets in geographic or, more generally, characteristic space and its use as evidence in merger cases. It outlines a structural, semi-nonparametric econometric model of competition in such markets, examines its testable implications in terms of price-concentration relationships, and demonstrates that the model is non-parametrically identified. This general approach to priceconcentration analysis in differentiated product markets is illustrated in a small-scale parametric application to cinemas in the UK. The application highlights the main decision points faced by an authority when assessing the weight that can be attached to this type of analysis as evidence.
is to investigate how concentration is related to market power, i.e. the ability of firms to price above marginal cost. To this end, there needs to be a number of independent markets for the same products where concentration varies sufficiently while other parameters remain relatively constant or can be accounted for with reasonable accuracy (particularly costs). In general, measures of concentration used will be Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices (HHIs) and C3 or C4 concentration ratios. 3 Each may have their own advantages (see Bishop and Walker (2002) for a discussion). In a common class of cases, where market shares are available and firms are similar in size, the number of firms (or independent fascias) may be used instead of concentration measures based on market shares. Using the number of firms instead of other concentration measures has the advantage of removing one source of endogeneity in the relationship as the number of firms is not a function of endogenous firm output or revenues (see Evans et al. (1993) ).
In price-concentration studies it is not necessarily a problem that the firms involved sell more than one good or that these products are differentiated either in the geographical or characteristics space, as long as the product mix or the actual product specification does not vary significantly across the local markets of the crosssection. Price concentration studies in industries with (horizontally) differentiated products have been used more frequently as they are suited for the analysis of many types of retail mergers. A merger between retail chains may bring under the same ownership outlets that were previously competing in a given local area. In these cases the main differentiating factor is likely to be the geographical location of the outlets.
Increasing public availability of pricing data and a desire on the part of regulators and courts for quantifiable evidence are certain to enhance both interest in and scrutiny of econometric price-concentration analyses. This will typically require balancing rigorous sophistication with practicability and robustness.
Practicability often takes precedence and induces reduced form approaches, in the absence of a structural competition model (e.g. US FTC vs. Staples; cp. Baker (1998), footnote 26). There are at least two fundamental risks associated with this research strategy: The structural interpretation of estimation results from the perspective of competition economics is unclear, and there is no theoretical guidance regarding potential joint endogeneity of firms' decision parameters and, if suspected, the choice and validity of instruments. The methodology advocated in this paper outlines a structural econometric model for competition in differentiated product markets that overcomes these shortcomings of reduced form models. The econometric model is inspired by classical theoretical models for differentiated product markets (Hotelling (1929 , Salop (1979 ). It is semi-nonparametric, making only minimal functional form assumptions. The modelling section examines the testable implications of the model and demonstrates that the relationships of interest are nonparametrically identifiable on the basis of instruments that have a sound theoretical justification.
This approach, in general, then stipulates a general nonparametric, nonlinear instrumental variable regression estimation methodology, using control functions (Blundell and Powell (2003) ). Nonparametric robustness is clearly a desirable feature of any econometric model. Nonparametric estimation, however, requires sample sizes significantly larger than those that may be available in applications. In smallscale applications, therefore, parametric and possibly linear instrumental variable methods may be more advantageous and practicable. This is illustrated in an application to local multiplex cinema markets in the UK. A small number of relatively similar multiplex cinema operators (fascias) are active in these markets, and adult ticket prices and number of operators and cinemas in them are readily available from public sources, as are various socio-demographic characteristics of localities.
The application demonstrates the biases that may result from an alternative, purely reduced form approach which is presented for the purpose of comparison. The application also shows that the modelling strategy is critical for empirical assessment as it puts regulators in a better position when assessing how much weight to place on such studies as evidence in competition inquiries. This paper argues that, contrary to some criticism (e.g. Baker and Bresnahan (1992) , Newmark (2004) ) price-concentration studies can be generally useful to assess the impact of mergers in differentiated product industries. It also argues that the structural form approach is superior to reduced form analyses as it enables the authority to make a more informed judgement.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the general structural, seminonparametric econometric model, including its testable implications, and examines its non-parametric identification. Section 3 considers a particular parametric specification that is applied to local multiplex cinema markets in the UK. After a brief description of the data, it also presents estimation results and compares them to estimates obtained from an alternative, reduced form model. Section 4 discusses implications for applied competition analysis. Section 5 concludes. For any good i = 1, . . . , n, out of n goods that a consumer might buy, the consumer is assumed to incur a direct pecuniary cost p i > 0, as well as a linear cost t > 0 that is attributable to the distance x i ∈ [0, 1] between the consumer and the firm producing it 4 . This latter cost can be interpreted as arising from the distance in characteristics space between the consumer's taste and the product variety i produced by the firm. It may depend on cost-relevant factors, such as product characteristics, 4 In the classical theoretical models, this cost is monetized as well.
taste attributes or other factors affecting consumers' choosiness (Armstrong (2006) ).
Let these be collected in the vector w, so that t = t(w). Both pecuniary and nonpecuniary costs induce the consumer's generalized cost φ(p i , t(w)x i , w), where w is allowed to affect generalized cost also in ways other than through the function t(w).
The generalized cost function φ(·, ·, w) is assumed to be strictly convex in its first two arguments, for any w.
The model stipulates that consumers have unit demands and make choices by minimizing the generalized cost associated with the purchase of a good, provided the surplus they derive from it is non-negative:
Next, consider firms. It is assumed that firms are located along the circle as well, with equal distance between them, so that, if there are n firms in the market, the distance between them is 1/n. The assumption of equidistant, exogenous firm locations, conditional on n, is a classical assumption in Salop style models.
It follows from the symmetry of firm locations and the convexity of the generalized cost functions that adjacent firms, say i and j, compete over the sub-population of consumers that is located between them. For any such consumer,
The marginal consumer firms i and j compete for is located at a distance x from firm i such that the generalized cost of purchasing from i and j are equalized:
where henceforth, for notational simplicity, the dependence of t on w is suppressed.
It follows from the Implicit Function Theorem that
where φ k is the partial derivative of φ with respect to argument k = 1, 2; the theorem also implies that there exists a function ξ in a neighborhood of (p i , p j , t, n) such that, for any w,
Strict convexity of φ also implies that ξ is increasing in p j , decreasing in p i and n, and decreasing in t if p j > p i and increasing otherwise. The situation is symmetric on both sides of firm i's location on the circle.
Given the assumption of exogenous firm location, firm i's strategic choice variable is its price, conditional on the price p j of, and the distance 1/n to, its adjacent competitors
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. Assuming firms maximize profits, firm i's reaction function is the solution to
where c > 0 and f > 0 denote marginal and fixed costs, respectively, which are assumed identical across firms. The first order condition to this problem, evaluated at the solution p , is
In the symmetric Nash equilibrium in prices, conditional on the number of firms n, p = p j for all j = 1, · · · , n, and so
where (p , t, n, w) is the elasticity of demand at p , conditional on n. Denote this solution by p = π(c, t, n, w) and note that π(·) is increasing in c and t and decreasing in n. Hence, in this model increased competition in terms of lower market concentration, corresponding to a larger number of firms n and, correspondingly, lower inter-firm distance 1/n, induces lower prices.
Firms' pricing decisions take the number of firms in the market, n, as given.
When deciding whether or not to be active in this market, firms will take into account the size of the market, µ(z), the costs of operating in the market, (c, f ), and the (prospective) price that can be earned in equilibrium. Assuming firms make this decision simultaneously, the equilibrium number of firms is such that economic profits in this market are zero, conditional on the prospective price. Ignoring integer constraints, for any given price p > c, the equilibrium number of firms n satisfies
In equilibrium, this price is the same for each of the two adjacent firms which implies
for some function η(·) which is increasing in p and µ(z) and decreasing in c and f .
The functions π(·) and η(·) form the structural part of the model. They can be solved for the reduced form of the model, which yields equilibrium price and number of firms as functions of the exogenous variables of the model, i.e. the market size, taste and cost parameters. Antitrust authorities's interest typically focuses on the structural relation π(·).
Econometric Model
In most applications, the analyst, at best, has only partial information about firms' 3 An illustration: Cinemas in the UK
The industry and the data available for analysis
The UK cinema industry is described in detail in a recent report by the UK Competition Commission. For the analysis presented in this paper, only multiplex cinemas in England with at least 5 screens were considered. The London metropolitan area was excluded, as it is considered to have very different market features compared to those prevailing in the rest of England. This leaves 153 such multiplexes in England. With regard to these cinemas, the following data were available: Saturday night adult ticket prices, the number of competing multiplexes and fascias in 10-minute and 20-minute drive-time around the cinema, the minimum drive time to the closest multiplex, the population and the deprivation index 7 of the area that the cinema is located in.
Model Specification
In light of the econometric model, prices -which in this market are typically held in place for one year -and number of multiplexes or fascias in local markets, defined by drive-time, are jointly endogenous. Hence, the latter must be instrumented when Tables 2 and 3 Table 9 : Minimum drive time to nearest multiplex: OLS Since the number of competitors n and the inter-firm distance 1/n are inversely related, a dual analysis can be carried out using the minimum drive time to the closest multiplex (mtm) as an alternative concentration measure. This is essentially a consistency check on the estimated model. Table 8 For the purpose of competition analysis, the 2SLS estimation results suggest that a 10-minute drive time area around a multiplex is the relevant antitrust market, because reducing the number of competing multiplexes or fascias by one is estimated to increase the adult ticket price on the order of 10 percent. From a methodological point of view, accounting for the endogeneity of number of competitors by using suitable instruments appears to be critical. While OLS in the specification using fascias still predicts a 5 percent price rise from increased market concentration, the OLS estimates using number of multiplexes as concentration measures yield predictions that are below the 5 percent threshold that is the typical benchmark for competition authorities. 
Estimation Results

Alternative Specification
An alternative view of the market might be cast in terms of firms' pricing decision, The use of price concentration analyses for industries with differentiated products has been critizised in the past (e.g. Newmark (2004) ). Baker and Bresnahan (1992) point out that in differentiated product industries the concentration measure (based on a given market boundary) does not take into account substitutes just outside the market. This criticism is based on the same reasoning that suggests that diversion ratios may be more informative than market shares in such industries. While this is an important point it is not enough to dismiss the relevance of price concentration studies in such contexts. The illustration showed that in horizontally differentiated markets such as the cinema industry a price concentration analysis can inform both market definition and the competitive assessment of a case. This is a case where differentiation is (only) geographical and therefore the model can be extended to test different hypotheses (different distances from a multiplex) with relative ease.
When there are more than one dimension of differentiation (for example in terms of quality as well as location), the procedure may be more complex but the relevance of these elements of differentiation, subject to data availability, can be tested and therefore inform both market definition and competitive assessment.
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The use of a fully developed functional form for the econometric model is important as it allows the decision maker to assess the implications of different regression specifications.
In this case the structural form presented in section 2.1. highlights the simultaneity problem. Bishop and Walker (2002) argue that, where this problem is evidenced by positive tests of simultaneity, instrumental variables should be used. However, they suggest that this is not a serious issue as the downward bias of the estimates 
Conclusions
This paper presents a semi-nonparametric structural econometric model for priceconcentration analyses, as they are critical to most competition inquiries. This model goes well beyond conventional reduced form approaches. The paper illustrates this approach in an application under data conditions typical in competition inquiries. The advantages of the advocated econometric methodology are clear.
The approach rests of relatively mild functional form assumptions and hence enjoys considerable robustness. Moreover, the estimation results can be given a sound structural interpretation. And, furthermore, the estimation methodology is immune to biases that arise as a consequence of jointly endogenous covariates. These benefits should provide assurance to practitioners and enhance the evidentiary value of price concentration analyses in competition inquiries.
